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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

ERNEST JOE VELASQUEZ,

Case No. 17242

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by Information with the crime
of Second Degree Murder, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-5-203 (1953 as amended).

Trial was held in the

Third Judicial District Court on June 2, 1980, through June
9, 1980.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted of Second Degree Murder in a
jury trial conducted before the Honorable Christine M. Durham.
He was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of five years
to life in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new
trial.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Paul Whitehead, the deceased's older brother, was the
first to discover his brother's body.

He testified that he

was contacted by the deceased's employer and asked to check
on his brother's whereabouts, who had failed to show for work.
CT.55)

Paul went to his brother's

apart~ent

several times

over a three day period, but received no resoonse when he knocke:
(T. 56-59)
(T.60)

He also checked the hospitals and police stations.

Finally he and Steve Southwood, who lived in an

across the hall. ?ained access to the deceased's apartment
through a window.
with a lamp cord

1

I
apartme:·I
.

They found Paul's brother lying on the bed
around his neck, and a gunshot wound on his

face through his eye.

CT.60,63,220)

In addition, there were

several abrasions on his forehead, which, according to the
State Medical Examiner, were probably caused by a blunt instnme: 1
(T.226)

A piece of wood was against the bed, and there was

blood on several walls.

CT. 249, 255) Prints lifted from these

smears matched appellant's fingerprints.

CT. 354, 361)

Some time later, officers from Adult Probation and Parole
searched appellant's apartment, which was across the hall from
deceased's apartment.

Appellant resided there with Brenda

Valentine and Jessie Garcia. CT. 177)

The officers seized

an automatic pistol, a magazine, and a box of
(T. 178, 186-7, 207)

.~2

cartridges.

The cartridge case taken from the decedent I

bed was subsequently compared to test casings fired by the
pistol, and the striations were consistent.

(T. 332)
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Both appellant and Brenda Valentine were thereafter
arrested, although charges against Brenda were ultimately dismissed.

<T. 278, 657)

Appellant was confronted with the fingerprint

match,and denied that the prints were his.

(T.300)

In a statement

to the police, Ms. Valentine said that one night appellant
came back to the apartment with blood all over him, and said
he'd just "dusted" someone.

(T. 654)

At trial, Ms. Valentine stated she had lied in her statement
to the police, and testified to the following sequence of facts,
as did appellant.

On Saturday, November 17th, a group of people

were drinking, playing guitar, and singing in appellant's apartment.
(T. 427, 513)

Around 10:30 deceased followed Brenda into the

kitchen and, putting his arms around her breasts, told her
he was going to "get her and screw her".

(T. 515, 517)

Brenda

shook him loose, and then went in to tell appellant what happened.
(T. 431-2, 517)

Appellant just advised her to cool down, and

some time later, after the deceased had gone, Brenda stated
that if appellant "wasn't going to do anything about it, she
was''.

(T. 435, 517)

She grabbed a knife and went over to

deceased's apartment. (T. 435, 518)

The deceased continued

to proposition her and grabbed the knife from her.
back and cut her hands.

(T. 521, 522)

She grabbed

When she returned and

showed appellant what happened, he went over to deceased's
apartment to try

to talk to him.

(T. 523)

-3-
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Appellant testified that when he entered deceased's
apartment, the latter had on a mask with a big nose and bushy
eyebrows, and an electrical cord around his neck.

CT. 437)

(The deceased' s brother later testified that he had seen "little
kid glasses and nose" when he cleaned out his brother's apartmen:
(T. 504)

Deceased said "how do you like my costume for tomorro".

Party?", and when confronted with cutting~ Brenda's hands, r e sponc,· j
"she's a lying bitch".
and a scuffle ensued.

(T. 438)

Appellant then swung at decease:

The deceased hit his head on the corner

1

\

of the door, and the two wrestled around the room until appellan:

i

finally knocked ::he deceased out.

/

(T. 439, 440)

Appellant

g~abbed the deceased by the cord around his neck and his shirt,

and dragged him onto the bed.

(T. 441)

Brenda then came in

with a gun, and as appellant walked out of the bedroom, he
heard a shot.

CT. 443)

Brenda testified that she walked into

the bedroom, saw the deceased passed out on the bed, pointed
the gun at him, thought about it a minute, then decided "I
can't do it,"

shook the gun, and it went off.

(T. 525)

She

went back to the appellant's apartment and put the gun in a
closet.CT. 527)
The jury returned a verdict pronouncing appellant guilty
of second degree murder.

-4-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS
FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH OF PREMISES OCCUPIED
BY PAROLEES.
Counsel for appellant made a pre-trial motion to suppress
State's Exhibits 1-5 (Playboy Magazines, . 22 caliber pistol,
clip, and .22 shells), which were seized during a warrantless
search of appellant's and Jessie Garcia's (both parolees) apartment.
The motion was denied (T. 171), and appellant asserts that
such denial deprived him of his constitutional guarantees under
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, and the United
States Constitution, Amendment IV.
The following facts were before the court at the pretrial motion.

Ernest Velasquez (appellant) occupied an apartment

across the hall from the deceased's apartment.

He had moved

there after coming to Utah from New Mexico, where he was on
parole.

(None of the testifying officers knew what he was

on parole for, however.

T.34, 116)

Jessie Garcia, who was

on parole in Utah for rape and murder, was staying temporarily
with

appellant.

(T. 151)

During the investigation of the

homicide, the police department became suspicious of appellant
and

Garcia, both because of their parolee status, and the

proximity of their residence to the scene of the homicide.
(T. 5,6)

Having insufficient evidence to obtain a warrant,

Police Officer Voyles contacted Dennis Holm, Director of State
Parole Services, and inquired as to Adult Probation and Parole's
He suggested it
authority
to conduct searc h es o f paro lees ·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would be helpful to his investigation if the parole officers
could search appellant's apartment.

(T. 6,7,19)

Subsequently,

a warrantless search was conducted by six parole officers which
produced the items of evidence identified as State's Exhibits
2-5.

The parole officers testified that they conducted the

search because (1) Garcia had offered to secure cocaine for
an informant, (2) two parolees were living together contrary
to department policy, and (3) two minor females were observed
at the apartment.

(T. 27)

In determining whether the search was lawful, the court
observed that

~arolees

have a lesser expectation of privacy

than do ordinary citizens.

(T. 170)

Therefore, if a search

is based on "reasonable suspicion", a warrant need not be obtaine.
prior to the search.

(T. 171)

The court held that the facts

in this case showed a "reasonable suspicion", and relied

on

the three reasons articulated by the parole officers, and,
in addition, the following factors, to buttress its ruling:
that neither Garcia nor appellant was employed, that a homicide
had occurred in the building, that Garcia had been connected
with violent crimes in the past, and that appellant had been
a witness to two homicides in New Mexico.

(T.169)

Regarding

the issue of consent to search, the court found that neither
appellant nor Garcia gave it, and, in any event, there was
insufficient evidence to make a finding of what the "common
areas" of the apartment were.

CT. 157, 172)

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant argued and now asserts that either a warrant
should have been procured, or special conditions of parole
consistent with appellant's needs as a parolee should have
been incorporated into a parole agreement so as to authorize
necessary warrantless searches.

(T. 160)

Appellant's argument

is supported by either of two emerging analyses in the case
law.

The first retains the warrant requirement, and the second

adopts a "middle ground", which allows warrantless searches
but imposes reasonable limitations thereon, most often in the
form of articulated conditions of parole.

Under either view,

the search in the instant case was illegal, and the evidence
seized should have been suppressed.
A. THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH WAS ILLEGAL SINCE THE
STATE FAILED TO SATISFY ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING AN
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
A warrantless search is per se unreasonable, "subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."
(1973).

Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 219

And the burden is on those seeking an exception to

the warrant requirement to establish the need for it.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).

The State

thus had the burden of showing that a "parolee exception" to
the warrant requirement existed.
Well-reasoned opinions and cases have recently rejected
a "parolee exception" to the warrant requirement, and hold
t h at parolee searc h es must Co nform to standards articulated
in the Fourth Amen dment. The SubJ·ect was treated in depth
· the case of Latta v. Fitzharris,
by Circuit Judge Huf ste dl er in
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521 F.2d 246, 254 (9th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion).

There

the majority held that a warrantless search of a parolee's
home, subsequent to his arrest for possession of marijuana,
was reasonable.

The court found that if a parole officer decidi

a search is necessary he is entitled to conduct one.

His

decis~

may be based only on a "hunch", but cannot be motivated by
a desire to harass or intimidate the parolee.

Judge Hufstedler.

with two judges joining her, was unable to agree that a parole
officer may search his parolee's residence, on a mere "hunch",
without probable cause and without a warrant.
to the majority s

:~ree

She responded

justifications for jettisoning the

warrant requirement as follows.
First, she disagreed with the majority's propositions
that requiring a warrant would reduce warrants to mere "paper
tigers" and impair effective parole supervision.

Rather, she

pointed out that the probable cause requirement is organic
in nature, and can be modified to accomodate the issuance of
parolee search warrants.

She noted that the developing case

law in the area of administrative searches reflects a similar
flexibility.

For example, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

U.S. 523, 538 (1967), the United States Supreme Court disagreed
that the issuing of warrants based on "area-wide" probable
cause for dwelling
warrants".

violations would authorize "synthetic search

The Court preferred to modify the traditional probab:

cause requirement rather than dispensing with it altogether.

-8-
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In fact, the court has dispensed with the warrant requirement
in the area of administrative searches in only one narrow and
limited situation.

That i's wh ere a warrant 1 ess search may

be made of business premises by licensed liquor or firearms
dealers pursuant to statute or ordinance supported by detailed
regulations.

See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972);

Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
By contrast, parole searches are not conducted pursuant
to statutory authority, nor are there regulations defining
the limits of a parole officer's authority to search.

Judge

Hufstedler recognized that without such standards, particularly
where the need to search varies with each parolee, a flexible
warrant requirement is the most effective way to fulfill constitutional
mandates without unreasonably restricting parole supervision.
She observed that evidentiary support for the probable cause
showing need not rise to the high standards of Aguilar-Spinelli,

1

but that it could not be based on a mere unsupported "hunch" of
a parole officer.

The magistrate would take into account the

nature of the suspected parole violations, the extent to which
persons other than the parolee would have their privacy invaded,
and the existence of less intrusive means than a full-blown
search to meet the parole officer's supervisory responsibilities.

1964); Spinelli v. United
1. Aguilar v. Texas, 3 7 8 US
. · 108 (
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second, Judge Hufstedler rejected the majority' s as serti:·
that the parole officer's intimate and supportive relationshio
with the parolee is an adequate substitute for the warrant
requirement, andenough to deter unreasonable searches.

She

acknowledged that while some parole officers maintain ideal
relationships with their parolees, more often parole systems
are characterized by inadequate training programs and burdensome
workloads.

A warrant requirement would prevent indiscriminate

searches which undermine the rehabilitative process.

Moreover,

the warrant requirement does not deprive the parole officer
of necessary tccls :o accomplish his goals.

He or she may

visit the parolee's home without procuring a warrant, and may,
if necessary, conduct a search based on exigent circumstances,
or seize evidence in plain view.
Third, Judge Hufstedler was not convinced that

subsequ~~

judicial review of the reasonableness of a search would protect
the parolee's Fourth Amendment rights or deter future unreasonabi
searches.

She persuasively argued that "the unarticulated

majority rule is that all searches of a parolee's home by his
parole officer are reasonable unless the particular search
later is deemed to have been harassing, intimidating, or too
overblown."

Id.

at 259.

In effect this creates a presumption

of reasonableness that may be dispelled only if the defendant
can establish the unreasonableness of the search.

Since the

search ordinarily has produced incriminating evidence, the
defendant's burden is heavy indeed.

Thus, the burden that
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constitutionally rests on the state to show an exception
·
to
the warrant requirement is effectively shifted to the defendant.
Judge Hufstedler rightly concluded that the net result is to
obliterate Fourth Amendment guarantees for parolees.
The Fourth Circuit has recently adopted Judge Hufstedler's
position.

In United States v. Bradley,

571 F.2d 787 (4th

Cir. 1978) the court held that the warrantless search of defendant's
room by his parole officer was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In Bradley,

the parole officer received phone calls from defendant's

landlady informing him that defendant was in possession of
a loaded firearm.

Without securing a warrant (even though

sufficient probable cause existed to secure one), the officer
conducted a thorough search of the parolee's room.

A firearm

was seized, defendant's parole revoked, and a conviction under
federal firearms law followed.

The court reversed, finding

that "Judge Hufstedler' s well-reasoned dissent in Latta . .
represents the preferable approach,"

id. at 789, and therefore

the parole officer was required to procure a search warrant.
The court discussed the ~majority's reliance on
the Biswell and Colonnade cases, supra, in which the Supreme
Court held the warrant requirement to be inoperative, and found
the reliance to be misplaced.

The Bradley court said that

Biswell and Colonnade represent narrow exceptions to the general
·
warrant requirement,
an d are i·nternally tailored by an authorizing
statute or regulations. Admi'ni'strative discretion to search
· h
b
t tute or administrative
a parolee is not regulated,however, eit er Y s a
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guidelines.

Thus, in the absence of appropriate guidelines,

the Bradley court was opposed to dispensing with the warrant
requirement.
In addition, the Bradley court was unconvinced that
a warrant requirement would disrupt the parole system.

While

the court was mindful of the important governmental interests
at stake, it nevertheless preferred to modify the rigorousness
of the probable cause standard rather than dispense with
protection that the warrantrequirement provides.

judici;;~

The court

agreed with Judge lfufstedler that "abuse of discretion is more
easily prevented J? prior judicial approval than by post hoc
review."

(citation omitted) 571 F.2d at 790.

jud::I

See also

United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978).
Several state courts have reached the same result.

In

State v. Cullison, 17 3 N. W. 2d 5 3 3 (Iowa, 197 0) the court grappk
with the issue of whether a parolee could challenge the evidenti 0:
use of

fruits obtained by a parole supervisor's warrantless,

nonconsent search of his living quarters.

In Cullison the

parole officer went to the parolee's apartment to ascertain
why the latter had not reported for work.

The parole officer

was aware that "break-ins" had occurred in the area, but was
unaware of any facts connecting the parolee to them.

When

he found the parolee at home, he attempted to open a locked
"interior door," and the parolee said he did not want the office'.
to go in there.

The parole officer returned later with a police:

and without a warrant gained access to the room where he discove::
stolen goods.

The court held the search to be unreasonable
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because it was not premised on probable cause.
A state parolee's Fourth Amendment rights, the court
O bserved,

person's.

is

to be ace or d e d t h e same recognition as any other

Absent an arrest-attendant search, or any other

valid exception to the warrant requirement, the parolee's privacy
cannot be invaded based solely on his status as a parolee.
The court emphasized that where a parolee stands to be convicted
of a new crime, as opposed to revocation of his parole, that
conviction should be based on evidence seized pursuant to Fourth
Amendment requirements.

If it is based on a search and seizure

lacking in probable cause, it denies the parolee equal protection
of the law.
Similarly, the court in State v. Gansz, 297 So. 2d 614
(Fla. App. 1974), found that the fact that a defendant is a
probationer 2 does not deprive him of his constitutional guarantee
in the form of a search warrant.
~eceived

In Gansz, the probation officer

an anonymous phone call that the probationer had been

dealing drugs from his house.
residence uncovered marijuana.

An ensuing search of the parolee's
On pre-trial motion, the court

suppressed the marijuana as the fruit of an illegal search

2. Numerous cases have recognized that there is no sig~ifi~ant
difference between a probationer's rights and a parolees rights
under the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. Roman v. State, 570 P.2d
1235, 1237 n.3 (Alas. 1977); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,
521 F.2d 359, 265 n.15, (9th Cir. 1975).
-13-
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and seizure.

Interlocutory appeal was taken by the state,

and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the officers
needed to secure a warrant before searching the premises.

While

the court refused to deny a probationer the right to Fourth
Amendment guarantees, the court nevertheless acknowledged
that a person's status as a probationer may be considered in
the determination of whether there is probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant.
Most recently, in State v. Fogartv, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont.
1980), the c:Ju:-t, relying in part upon its own state constitutiJ:.
squarely held :tat a search warrant based on probable cause
must be obtained before a probationer's residence can be searchec
In Fogarty one of the express conditions of defendant's probatic: I
provided for warrantless searches, yet the court found that
such searches could be too intrusive, especially upon innocent
third parties who live with the parolee.

Therefore, the probat'.:

officer must have a "reasonable basis" to conclude that the
probationer has violated his probation, and if relying on outsidE
information must set forth in affidavit form the source and
its reliability.

In addition, the court imposed the requirement

that the judge set reasonable limitations as to the time, place.
and manner of the search.
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In the instant case, the court found that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.

(T.170)

It was because of this insufficieny that Detective Voyles contacted
Dennis Holm.

He admitted that there was insufficient evidence

to get a search warrant, so he was looking for other ways to
gain access to the apartment.

(T.8)

It is precisely this

kind of abuse which the warrant requirement seeks to avoid.
A post hoc determination of reasonableness, as the court made
here, in the face of incriminating evidence in a serious criminal
case, simply fails to provide adequate protection for the parolee.
The appellant was placed in the position of having to show
that the search was capricious, or harassing or intimidating,
or in some other way unreasonable.

The burden is not only

misplaced, it is insurmountable.
That the appellant had the burden of showing an unreasonable
search is apparent from the bootstrapping technique of the
state in amassing the factors supporting the reasonableness
of the search.

The only evidence of any substance whatsoever

justifying the search was the information concerning an offer,
not by appellant, but by Garcia, to sell cocaine on one occasion.
(T. 143)

The informant was undisclosed, and no evidence whatsoever

of his or her reliability was produced.
on which to justify a full scale search.

This was flimsy information
The other factors,

the parolees living together' the presence of the juvenile
girls, and the unemployment of the parolees, could have been
effectively checked out by a routine visit.

The court also lent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

significance to the fact that appellant had witnessed two
homicides in New Mexico.

This was quite irrelevant, unless a

parole officer is entitled to engage
to justify his search of a parolee.

in all sorts of speculation
And the fact that a

homicide occurred in the building certainly doesn't authorize
complete searches of all parolees in the vicinity, no more
than "break-ins" in the area authorized the parole officer in
Cullison, supra, to search the parolee's premises.
Clearly, the only arguable justification for the search
was the information regarding Garcia's offer to sell cocaine.
It may be that with a flexible probable cause requirement, and
a showing as to the reliability of the informant, such inforrnatio'.
would have justified the issuance of a warrant.

In any event,

that determination should have been made by the judge, and not
by a parole officer at the behest of a police officer seeking
to enhance his investigatory alternatives.

Appellant submits tha:

the better rule requires a parole officer to procure a search
warrant before conducting a search of his parolee's premises,
and asks this court to reverse the trial court's ruling that
such a warrant is unnecessary.

-16-
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B. THE SEARCH WAS UNREASONABLE EVEN IF THIS COURT
ADOPTS THE WARRANTLESS, "MIDDLE-GROUND'' APPROACH.
While some courts have not extended the warrant requirement
to searches and seizures of parolees, neither have they been
inclined to adopt the loose "hunch" test articulated in
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F. 2d 246.

Instead, they utilize

a "middle ground" approach to the area of parole search and
seizure that offers a compromise; that is, warrantless searches
are acceptable only if they are carefully circumscribed.

Decisions

range from the requirement that a warrantless search is proper
only if articulated specifically in the terms of parole, to
the requirement that searches conducted pursuant to an informer's
tip-off can only be reasonable if the informant is shown to
be reliable.
Several well-reasoned cases stand for the proposition
that a probationer or parolee retains all civil liberties except
those which are taken away as specific conditions of probation.
In State v. Culbertson, 563 P.2d 1224 (Or. App. 1977), a probation
officer received information from a police officer that defendant
had about 50 pounds of marijuana in his house.

Lacking sufficient

reliable evidence to obtain a search warrant, the probation
officer and a policeman proceeded to the probationer's residence
where they conducted a cursory searc h ·

They observed "remnants

of marijuana", and were then able to procure a search warrant.
Upon execution of the warrant, marijuana was discovered and
the defendant's probation was revoked.
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In discussing whether or not the initial search was
constitutionally permissible, the court rejected an absolute
warrant requirement, and found the Latta rule authorizing the
invasion of the parolee's privacy for probation-related purposes '
to be equally distasteful.

The court observed that the Latta ruce

would allow the decision to search to be completely executive
rather than judicial, and thus contrary to the intent of the
Fourth Amendment.

On the other hand, the view that Fourth

Amendment rights are unaffected by probation ignores legitimate
supervisory needs of the probationer.

Consequently, the court

concluded it would adopt what it called "the middle way", and
allow warrantless searches only where a specific condition
in a defendant's probation so authorizes.

Since the defendant's

conditions of probation failed to disclose any special

requirerne~'.

1

affecting his expectation of privacy, and the entry was not
based on probable cause, the fruits of the search were inadmiss~:

1

Similarly, the court in State v. R. H., 406 A.2d 1350
(N.H. Juv. & Dorn. Ct. 1979), rejected the State's claim that
a juvenile, R.H., lost her Fourth Amendment rights when she
became a probationer.

The court observed that the mere "status"

of probationer does not work a forfeiture of such guarantees;
however, the incorporation of specific conditions in the probati.c'.,
agreement may well have such an effect.

But the condition

must be specific enough to clearly and positively inform the
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probationer of the nature of the forfeiture.
R.H.

The fact that

signed a statement acknowledging general rules and conditions

of probation was not enough.

The court thus suppressed the

evidence found in the unlawful search.
In Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alas. 1977), the Supreme
Court of Alaska was asked to determine the nature and extent
of a parolee's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the parallel provision in the state
constitution.

The court held that a parolee is entitled to

the same protection as an ordinary person unless a reasonably
conducted search is required by legitimate demands of correctional
3
authorities
and is set forth as a condition of parole by
the Parole Board.

The court felt that the Parole Board is

in the best position to specify when and under what circumstances
searches are permissible.

The court declared:

[W]e believe that conditions of parole authorizing
searches should be specified by the Parole Board
[and imposed by the judge, who would rule on
proposed charges] and not left to the discretion
of individual oarole officers.
[footnote omitted]
This procedure.will afford parolees some of the
protections accorded others before issuance of
search warrants, without burdening parole authorities
with the requirement of securing warrants for each
search.
Id. at 1244.
This guarantee of due process, according to the court, ensures
that the parolee is protected from undue harassment.

3.
A warrantless search provision in a parole agreement is
not carte blanche to search without restriction. The search
must be related to the parole officer's duty to detect and
prevent parole violations. See People v. Mackie, 430 NYS 2d
733 (App. Div. 1980).
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While the courts are willing to allow warrantless searcheo
pursuant to specified conditions of probation or parole, they
are wary of sanctioning "boiler-plate" search provisions.

For

this reason, the vast majority have imposed an additional requi::o:j
that there exist a reasonable relationship between the parolee's
4
underlying offense and the condition of parole.
Thus, in
the

~

case, the court noted that a warrantless search provi;::

might be permissible in the case of one convicted of a drug
offense or an offense involving stolen property, to ensure
that such ac:ivities have ceased.
the case of one

But such a provision in

convicted of manslaughter while recklessly

driving would not be permissible.
The court in Sprague v. Alaska, 590 P.2d 410 (Alas.
1980) found a probation condition to be inappropriate.

There

Sprague pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of Burglary and
was placed on probation.

A condition of his probation was

that, upon request of a probation officer, he submit himself
and his property to a search for the presence of narcotics
or dangerous drugs.

Despite Sprague's admissions of "drug

contacts" in the presentence report, the court found an insufficii''
nexus between the underlying offense and the condition of probar:·
The court observed:

4. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. lf
Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971); Roman v. Sta~
570 P.2d 1235 (Alas. 1977); Seim v. State, 590 P.2d 1152, USo,.
(Nev. 1979) ["special condition of probation was clearly relatea :.1
appellant's prior criminal conduct. . . "]; This standard is con 51 '
with ALI Model Penal Code Section 305.13(j) (Proposed Official J:
1962), and ABA Project on Standards for Crimina! Justice, Stand~
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If we were to uphold the probation condition in
t~is case, in effect, we would be opening up
virtually all classes of offenders to warrantless
searches on less than probable cause.
~ at 418.
In the instant case, the state failed to introduce any
evidence regarding conditions, whether standardized or specific,
that were imposed on Garcia and/or appellant.

In Utah, the

Board of Pardons is authorized to adopt general conditions
under which parole shall be granted and revoked, and the defendant
must

sign a certificate specifying the conditions of parole

when he is released.

See Utah Code Ann. Section 77-62-7 (1953

as amended), new provisions Section 77-27-7 (1980); Utah Code
Ann. Section 77-62-15 (1953 as amended), new provisions Section
77-27-15 (1980).

No evidence of any certificate was produced

by the state with reference to either Garcia or appellant,

and the prosecutor specifically stated that he didn't think
any standard consent agreement existed.

(T.

96) Utah granted

appellant compact supervision from New Mexico, but appellant
did not sign a Utah parole agreement, nor were any terms and
conditions spelled out for him.

(T. 133)

Therefore, neither

Garcia nor appellant should have suffered the loss of any constitutional
rights where no conditions of probation specifically removed
those rights.
Even if certain conditions could be implied,

(although

the pcosecutor specifically stated he was ~ relying on an
i~plied consent theory, T.

99)

the state failed to show that

the conditions were reasonably related to the underlying offense

-21-
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We find that the parole officers here were not
seeking to ascertain proof of a parole violation,
but rather were acting as agents of the police, thereby
enabling the police to circumvent constitutional
requirements. Id. at 786.
Similarly, in the instant case, the search by the parole
off ice rs enabled the police to circumvent cons ti tut iona 1 require:,1
Adult Probation and Parole was contacted
regarding the homicide.

by Detective Voyles

Detective Voyles specifically asked

Dennis Holm about the guidelines regarding searches of parolees.
(T. 6)

He told Holm it would be "beneficial for [his] department''

to conduct a search of Apt. 3, the apartment occupied by Garcia
and appellant.

(T.7)

He admitted he was looking for other

ways to gain access to the apartment since he didn't have sufficLI
evidence to obtain a search warrant.

(T.8)

Moreover, Holm

admitted that Voyle asked him to make a search of the apartment,
but then insisted that the search was conducted for entirely
different reasons.

(T. 38)

A realistic appraisal of the evidence

were acting as agents for the police in order to find
evidence regarding the homicide.

i
I

in this case leads to the conclusion that the parole officers

incriminac~\

As the Candelaria court noted:

[A] parolee's status ought not to be exploited
to allow a search which is designed solely to
collect contraband or evidence in aid of the
prosecution of an independent criminal investigation
Id. at 786.
It is clear that the parole

officers were not seeking to

ascertain proof .of a parole violation, but rather were exploiti~
... !

the "parolee status" of both men in order to aid in the investig,.
of the homicide.
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The second factor discussed by courts which is pertinent
in this fact situation is the nature of the information relied
upon by the parole or probation officers to justify the search.
In State v.

Simms, 516 P.2d 1088 (Wash. 1974)

the court held

that before a parole officer may forcibly enter a parolee's
residence without a warrant, on the tip of an informer, the
tip must carry some indicia of reliability to support an inference
that the informer is telling the truth.

Similarly, in

Peoole v. Jackson, 385 NE 2d 621 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978) the court
held that, while the probation officer was under a duty to
investigate an anonymous complaint against the defendant, he
nevertheless acted unreasonably in conducting a wholesale search
of defendant, his locker, and his automobile.

The court noted

that the probationer had not previously been an unreliable
probation risk, that the source of information could not be
assessed, and that other ways existed for checking out the complaint.
In the present case, no evidence was offered concerning
the identity of the informant, nor was any evidence offered
concerning the facts or circumstances from which the informant
concluded that Garcia had offered to make a sale of cocaine.
The basis of the tip here may have been nothing more than a
casual rumor, or worse, a fabrication offered by the parole
officers to justify the search.

In any event, it is not enough

to support a well-founded suspicion that a parole violation
occurred

See State v.

Simms, at 1094.
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It was error for the trial court to deny appellant's
motion to suppress the fruits of the search of Apt. 3. Appellan~
was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment the
same as an

ordinary person in the absence of any valid conditons

waiving his right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.

Furthermore, there was substantial evidence that

the search was little more than a subterfuge for a criminal
investigation.

And lastly, even if the search was conducted

in order to detect possible parole violations, the information
advanced to justify the search was unreliable.
POINT II
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO
CUMULATIVE ERROR WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE COURSE
OF THE TRIAL.
Numerous errors occurred during the course of the trial.
Independently, some of these errors may not have been prejudicial
enough to warrant reversal.

Nevertheless, the cumulative impact

of the errors was to preclude appellant from presenting an
effective defense and obtaining a fair trial.

See State v. St._9

282 P.2d 323 (Ut. 1955).

A. TWO WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION VIOLATED
THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
Section 78-7-4, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, provides:
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE IN CERTAIN CASES. --In an action
of divorce, criminal conversation, seduction, abortion,
rape, or assault with intent to commit rape, the court
m~y, in i~s discretion, exclude all persons who are not
directly interested therein, except jurors, witnesses
and officers of the court; and in any cause the court
m~y, in its discretion, during the examination of a
witness exclude any and all other· witnesses in the cause.
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I

Upon the commencement of trial, counsel for appellant asked
that the exclusionary rule be invoked and the court granted
this request.

(T. 50,51)

Towards the end of the trial, Detective Robert Gillies
testified for the prosecution.

(T.671)

On cross-examination

he admitted that he had discussed Officer Voyles' testimony
with him just before he (Gillies) took the stand.

(T. 681)

Specifically, Detective Gillies stated that Detective Voyles
told him that he (Voyles) had testified that it was a twenty
minute drive from the place of arrest (of Brenda Valentine)
to the police station (T. 683), and that Brenda Valentine had
been drinking.

(T. 684)

Counsel for appellant subsequently

motioned for a mistrial on the basis that the two officers
had clearly violated the exclusionary rule.

(T. 688)

The

court agreed that the conduct constituted a violation of its
order, but ruled that Gillies' testimony was not prejudiced
by his conversation with Voyles.

(T. 689)

The law is settled in Utah that a decision as to whether
a violation of the exclusionary rule warrants the declaration

of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Dodge, 564 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977).

In State v. Carlson, Nos.

16582, 16583 (July 31, 1981), defendant claimed error by the
trial court's failure to strike testimony offered by police
officers establishing a chain of custody.

During the trial,

the court was advised that over the noon recess the prosecutor
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had called the officers into his office to discuss the chain
of custody of the evidence.

Such a discussion constituted

a violation of the exclusionary rule.

This court held that

the defendant failed to show prejudice by the violation of
the rule, and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in failing to strike the testimony.
Other courts apply the same standard, but suggest that
certain factors be considered in deciding whether to admit
or exclude the witness' testimony where the witness has violated
the exclusionary rule.

For instance, in State v. Barboa, 506

P.2d 1222 (N.M. 1973), the court advised that the trial court
consider whether the witness' violation was deliberate or inadve::q
or whether the violation was condoned by counsel.

Id. at 1224.

In the instant case, both Detective Voyles and Gillies
were (and are) experienced police officers.

Detective Voyles

testified that he had 13 years experience with the Salt Lake
City Police Department.

(T. 245)

It could hardly be said

that the officers' conversation in violation of the exclusionary
rule was "inadvertant".

The court clearly found the violation

to be error, and considered contempt of court proceedings.
CT. 688)

However, the court's final ruling

was that no prejudic<

inured to appellant as a result of the violation.

Appellant

asserts that even if no actual prejudice can be shown by the
officers' violation of the court order, the error, combined
with other errors occurring during the course of the trial,
entitles him to a reversal and a new trial.
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B. TWO JURORS VIOLATED THE COURT'S ADMONITION
TO AVOID TRIAL PUBLICITY BY READING NEWSPAPER
ARTICLES CONCERNING THE CASE.
Before the court recessed for the weekend, it admonished
the jurors to ignore all press reports concerning the case.
(T.586)

Over the weekend, a number of news reports were released

which discussed the progress of the case.

CT. 588)

On Monday,

in an effort to ascertain whether any of the jurors had been
exposed to the reports, the court interviewed each juror individually.
(T. 588-608)
Mrs.

Two of the jurors, Mrs. Zabriskie (T. 596) and

Bancroft (T. 601) had read news articles about the case.

On the basis of this misconduct, counsel for appellant motioned

for a mistrial.

(T. 608)

The court acknowledged that the

jurors were wrong in failing to follow the instructions of
the court, but held that no prejudice was shown, and denied
appellant's motion.

CT. 611)

It is beyond question that a defendant is entitled to
a fair and impartial trial, free of sensational publicity which
has the effect of trying and convicting the accused in the
eyes of the public.
1967).

Sinclair v. Turner, 434 P.2d 304 (Utah

On the other hand, the public has an interest in obtaining

information of public concern, and in promoting freedom of
speech and of the press.

Id.

The latter interest, however,

is modified as it applies to a jury sitting for a particular
case, and jurors are frequently admonished to refrain from
reading and watching news reports concerning their case.
court in People v. Lessard, 375 P.2d 46, 49 (Cal.

The

196~), expressed

the general principle as follows:
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There can be no doubt that the reading by jurors
of newspaper accounts of a trial in which they are
engaged amounts to a violation of their duty and
obligation and if such newspaper accounts would be
at all likely to influence jurors in the performance
of duty, the act would constitute a ground for a
motion for a new trial.
Whether or not exposure to media accounts of a case
is sufficient to warrant reversal lies within the discretion
of the trial court.

State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977).

The court must determine whether the exposure either actually
or probably prejudiced the jury.
U.S. 333 (1966).
1975) .

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384

See also, State v. Knapp, 540 P.2d 898 (Wash.

Utah apparently adheres to this standard as well.

See State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d at 710, ["Defendant did not
show any actual juror bias as a result of improper publicity
nor did he show that the publicity was inherently prejudicial."];
State v. Andrews, 576 P.2d 857 (Utah 1978), [defendant must
show "actual prejudice" or a "substantial likelihood" that
prejudice resulted from refusal to sequester jury].
In the instant case, both jurors stated to the court
that their exposure to the newspaper articles would not influence
their ability to render an impartial verdict.
concluded no actual prejudice was shown.

Thus, the court

Even if no actual

prejudice can be shown, there nevertheless existed some probabilit.
that the information contained in the articles influenced the
jurors.

In light of this potential for prejudice, and other

errors occurring at trial, the appellant was denied his right
to a fair and impartial jury trial.
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C.
THE COURT IMPROPERLY RSSTRICTED APPELLANT'S
CROSS-EXAMI'.'lATION OF AN EXPERT WIT:lESS.
At trial the state qualified Bill Simpson as a fingerprint
expert and elicited testimony regarding the procedures employed
~y

him in lifting fingerprints from the deceased' s bedroom

'.·1all and comparing them to appellant's prints.
361)

(T.

350, 354,

On cross-examination, defense co\Elsel asked the expert

·.·1hether he measured the distances between the pain ts of comparison.
(T.

369)

The expert admitted that he made no such measurements

since he didn't have a "one to one reproduction", and acknowledged
that such a procedure is common in comparing prints.

(T.

369)

Jefense counsel then attempted to ascertain what effect variances
in distances between the points of comparison might have on the
reliability of the print comparison.

(T.

369-370)

The state

objected and the court terminated this line of questioning on
the basis that defense counsel couldn't ask "hypothetical
questions that contain facts that are not in evidence".

(T.

371)

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in restricting
defense counsel's attempted cross-examination.
This court has set out the standard for cross-examination
of an expert witness in State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980).
There the court stated that an expert may give an opinion based
on reasonable possibilities within the factual and legal issues
in the case, out may not give an
speculation.

Id.

at 231.

opinion based purely on

Thus, an expert may render an

opinion using words like "might have" or "could have", so that
rhc conclusion "fits the relative degree or certainty to which
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the opinion is entitled."

Id.

This gives defense counsel

the "ample elbowroom" which he "must be allowed" in conducting
cross-examination.

Id. at 230.

Allowing substantial latitude in the cross-examination
of an expert clearly comports with the policies behind the
adoption of Rule 58 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

That rule

provides:
HYPOTHESIS FOR EXPERT OPINION NOT NECESSARY.
Questions calling for the opinion of an
expert witness need not be hypothetical
in form unless the judge in his discretion
so requires, but the witness may state
his opinion and reasons therefor without
first specifying data on which it is based
as an hypothesis or otherwise; but upon
cross-examination he may be required to
specify such data.
Since the expert need not specify the data forming the basis
of his opinion on direct examination, the cross-examiner must
have free reign to vigorously test and expose any weaknesses
in the foundation of the expert opinion.

Oregon adopted Rule

58 as well, and the court in Samuel v. Vanderheiden, 560 P.2d
636, 639 (Ore. 1977) discussed the shifting of responsibility
to the cross-examiner under the rule:

* The premise of the new rule is that
defective or prejudicial examinations of
an expert witness can be corrected on crossexamination. * * *

"* *

"The means available to opposing counsel
to discredit an expert opinion based on
a one-sided interpretation of evidence
are rather limited. He must demonstrate
to the jury on cross-examination that a
change in the facts which the expert assumes
to be true necessitates a modification
of the opinion, and then later in closing
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argument he must suggest that the jury
sh'?u~d not give the opinion great weight. * * *"
[citing Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz Co. Inc.,
498 P.2d 766 (Ore. 1972), and Comment
0 inion Testimon of Exert Witnesses;
Oregon s New Ru e, 5 Or. L. Rev.
(1973) J
Other cases have also emphasized the importance of allowing
great latitude in the cross-examination of an expert witness.
In Timsah v. General Motors Corp., 591 P.2d 154, 164 (Kan.
1979), the court held that it was proper to allow experts to
be questioned on other possible causes of

hose defects, and

stated:
Great latitude is necessarily indulged
in the cross-examination of an expert witness
in order that the intelligence and powers
of discernment of the witness, as well
as his capacity to form a correct judgment,
may be submitted to the jury so it may
have an opportunity for determining the
value of his testimony.
(citation omitted)
In State v. Hull, 578 P.2d 434 (Ore. 1978) the court noted
that cross-examination of an expert witness is a formidable
task and the cross-examiner must therefore be able to test
adequately the basis of the opinion.

The court stated:

It is proper to test by questions to the
expert the factual data used in arriving
at a conclusion and equally proper to elicit
from the witness that she was unaware of
relevant facts that may affect the opinion.
Id. at 437.
And in State v. Bell, 560 P.2d 925 (N.M. 1977), defense counsel
objected to a hypothetical question propounded to the expert
on the basis that (1) the witness did not know what reagent
was used in a sperm test, (2) there was no evidence to support
the witness' opinion as to the method of obtaining the count

imony upon which the
test
h erefor digitization
3) tFunding
o f acid phosphatase
andLaw(Library.
was no
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witness could base his opinion as to other possible contributing
factors to the acid phosphatase count.

The court held that

J.

the expert was properly permitted to answer, and that any object'. '
by defendant went to the weight, rather than the admissibility,
of the evidence.
In the instant case, defense counsel's attempted cross-

o

examination of Mr. Simpson should have been allowed for a number

a

of reasons.

e

First, the jury was entitled to know what relevant

information was not available to or considered by the expert

s

in arriving at his opinion just as it was entitled to know

e

what information was available.

6

Second, counsel was entitled

to test out the factual data relied on by the expert, and thereby
expose weaknesses in it.

Third, counsel should have been allowed

to show that a change in the facts assumed by the expert might
necessitate a change in his opinion.
The expert clearly assumed that there were no variances
in the distances between the points of comparison.

If adequate

measurements had been taken, variances might have been apparent,
and a change of opinion might have been necessary.

Counsel

was therefore entitled to question the witness as to the relevanc:i
and impact of possible variances in measurement between the
comparison points.

Since counsel was prohibited from fully

testing the reliability of Mr. Simpson's conclusions, he was
unable to challenge the expert's competency and the
to be accorded his opinion.

weight

This was error and denied appellant

-34-
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"ample elbowroom" in cross-examining the expert.
Jarrell, supra.
D. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF IMPROPER HEARSAY TESTIMONY ELICITED FROM TWO
STATE WITNESSES.
On December 6th, Brenda Valentine made statements to
officers Voyles and Gillies at the police station implicating
appellant in the homicide.

(T. 650, 671-2)

At trial, on direct

examination, she admitted that she had lied to them.

(T. 529)

Subsequently, the state called both officers to the stand and
elicited testimony regarding the substance of Brenda's December
6th statements.

Defense counsel, while failing to object to

this testimony when it was offered, later made a motion to
strike it on the basis that it was hearsay.

(T.710)

Counsel

argued that it wa-s inadmissible as a prior inconsistent statement
inasmuch as Brenda admitted that she had lied when she took
the stand.

(T.

710)

The court denied the motion and agreed with the state
that portions of the testimony were admissible as exceptions
to the hearsay rule under Rule 63(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
That section provides:
(1) Prior Statements of Witnesses. A
prior statement of a witness, if the judge
finds that the witness had an adequate
opportunity to perceive the event o: condition
which his statement narrates, describes
or explains, provided that (a) it i~ incons~stent
with his present testimony, o: (b) it 7ontains
otherwise admissible facts which the witness
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to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for
justifiable cause."]

No Utah authorities have been discovered

by the author that deal with the avoidance of stipulations in
a criminal context.

However, there seems to be no reason to

distinguish between criminal and civil cases.

The standard

articulated above, therefore, should be applicable in the instant
case.
The prosecutor in this case entered into a stipulation
with defense counsel knowing full well what issues would be
presented at trial.

Appellant acknowledges the fact that Brenda's

confession was a new development during trial.

Nevertheless,

the cause of death, and the circumstances surrounding the death,
as shown by the position of the body on the bed, were in issue
from the beginning.

Absent "mistake" on the prosecutor's part,

on some other justifiable cause, the court should not have allowed
the prosecutor to renege on his stipulation.
was

While this error

probably not independently prejudicial, it

nonetheless

necessitates reversal when combined with other errors at trial.
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CONCLUSION

Appellant is entitled to a new trial for two reasons.
First, the trial court erred in failing to suppress fruits of
an illegal seizure of evidence obtained from a warrantless search
of the residence of parolees.

Second, appellant did not get

a fair trial due to cumulative error which occurred throughout
the trial.

He respectfully asks this court, therefore, to reverse

his conviction

and grant him a new trial.

Respectfully submitted this ~day of September, 1981.

R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was
delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114 this

day of

September, 1981.
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